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Dadisman: Conduct of Judges and Lawyers
CJASE COMMENTS

promote justice, but such statutes should not be so construed as
to make them useless and contrary to the apparent intent of the
legislature. Petitioner's overpayment was caused by his own
failure to claim a statutory exemption which demonstrates that
there was no injustice on the part of the state. A taxpayer is given
an adequate remedy by this statute and if he does not avail himself
of it he should be denied relief.
J. M. H.

WORK-MEN'S COMPENSATION-SiLiCO5s-APPLICATION

FOR BENE-

Frrs.-Under an application for compensation filed July 17, 1951,

because of silicosis, it was established that claimant had been employed in West Virginia for ten years prior to the time of the
filing of his application. It was further established that claimant
had worked for at least two years continuously during this period;

that the two years had been spent in contact with the hazard of
silicon dioxide dust; and that although claimant had been
employed by the United States Steel Company from August, 1949
to March 18, 1950, he had worked only fifty-five days during that
period. After the State Compensation Commissioner awarded compensation, the employer appealed to the Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board, which reversed the commissioners order. Claimant
appealed. Held, that the order of the commissioner should be
reinstated inasmuch as the claim had been filed within two years of
the last exposure to the hazard, although the claimant had not
worked sixty days during the two-year period. It was further held
that the word "continuous" and the phrase "continuous period"
as used in the Compensation Act mean with "reasonable continuity". Richardson v. State Compensation Comm'r, 74 S.E.2d
258 (W. Va. 1953).
This case is of prime importance in that it decides two points
of "first impression" in West Virginia. First, when must a claimant
file an application for compensation on the ground that he is
suffering from silicosis; and second, what constitutes an exposure
for "a continuous period of sixty days"?
Three statutory provisions were construed in answering the
questions stated. They appear in W. VA. CODE c. 23, art. 4 (Michie,
1949). The following are pertinent excerpts therefrom:
the commissioner shall disburse the compensation
§ 1. "...
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fund ....
Provided, however, that compensation shall not be
payable for the disease of silicosis ....
unless in the State of West
Virginia the employee has been exposed to the hazard . . . over a

continuous period of not less than two years during the ten years
immediately preceding the date of his last exposure... [and the
commissioner may charge the account of the employer by whom
the employee was employed] for as much as sixty days during the
period of two years immediately preceding the filing of the application."
§ 15.

"...

to entitle any employee to compensation .

.

. the

application must be... filed in the office of the commissioner within
two years ... from and after the last day of the last continuous
period of sixty days .

§

15b.

"...

.

. during which the employee was exposed.

the commissioner shall determine whether the

claimant was exposed to the hazard.., for a continuous period of
not less than sixty days while in the employ of the employer within
two years prior to the filing of his claim...
In deciding that Section 15 was controlling and that there was
present no ambiguity or inconsistency between and among the
statutes in point, the court appears to have reached a desirable
conclusion. To say, however, as the court did, that such a decision
gives effect to the intent of the legislature is another matter. Reading Sections 1 and 15b together it is found that in order to charge
the account of any one employer the claimant must have been
employed by that employer for as much as sixty days during the
two years immediately preceding the filing of the application. This
case holds that if the application is filed within two years from the
last exposure of at least sixty days, it is timely and fulfills the requisites set up in Section 15.
Suppose now that the following case would arise: A, who has
worked in West Virginia for a period of ten years and who has
been exposed to the hazard for a period of two years during that
ten years, upon completing a sixty day period of work for B, is fired.
Twenty-three months later, without having worked in the meantime, finding that he is suffering from silicosis, he filed his application for compensation. This is clearly a case in which all the
statutory requirements have been fulfilled and A is entitled to
benefits. But which employer's account in the compensation fund
shall be charged? It is obvious that no employer account can be
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charged because A had not worked sixty days during the two years
immediately preceding the application. And if no employer can
be charged-no payment can be made from the geneal compensation
fund. The solution to this problem lies in the surplus fund. W. VA.
CODE c. 23, art. 3, § 1 (Michie, 1949) provides for the establishment
of such a fund to cover the "catastrophe hazard, the second injury
hazard, and all losses not otherwise provided for in this chapter."
Since this type of loss is "not otherwise provided for", payment
must be made from the surplus fund. Was such the intent of the
legislature-or did they not intend that whenever a recovery was
allowed for silicosis it always be charged to an employer's account
and paid out of the general fund?
Apparently, the commissioner has been allowing claims only
when some employer's account could be charged, for, as indicated
in Bumpus v. State Compensation Comm'r. 74 S.E.2d 262 (W. Va.
1952), unless a claim was filed within twenty-two months from
and after the last sixty-day continuous period of employment,
benefits were being denied. The Supreme Court of Appeals, of
course, overruled the denial in that case, holding that the decision
of the instant case controlled.
Thus, the law stands decided that Section 15 is the controlling
statute with reference to the time for filing an application for
benefits because of silicosis, and that although Sections 1 and 15b
deal with related subjects their function is to set up a standard on
which to base the allocation of charges against the accounts of
multiple employers. They do not control the right of a claimant to
compensation if, in West Virginia, he "has been exposed to the
hazard . . . over a continuous period of not less than two years
during the ten years immediately preceding the date of his last
exposure."
In resolving the answer as to what the legislature meant by a
"continuous period" the court had little difficulty, despite a decided
split of authority in other jurisdictions.
Although the following cases, decided in other jurisdictions,
do not deal with the word "continuous" or the phrase "continuous
period" as used in compensation statutes, they show that "continuous" can be interpreted to have several meanings. It has been said
to mean: more or less frequently according to the nature of the use
intended, Von Meding v. Strohl, 319 Mich. 398, 30 N.W.2d 363
(1948) (easement); and with reasonable regularity under normal
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conditions to be applied with reference to the incidents of a given
employment, Anair v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 Vt. 217, 42 A.2d
423 (1945) (disability provision). On the contrary, it has been construed as meaning: for an unbroken, uninterrupted period, Jordon
v. Jordon, 69 Idaho 513, 210 P.2d 934 (1949) (desertion); connected,
extended or prolonged without separation or inteiruption, Hode v.
Sanford, 101 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1939) (criminal sentence); and without intervening space or time, constant and unceasing, Wolfe v.
State, 127 Tex. C.L. 218, 75 S.W.2d 677 (1934) (criminal statute).
It is, of course, the natural assumption that the word "continuous" refers to a period which has not been interrupted or terminated, and the most which can be said against such an assumption
is that it is not an inevitable conclusion, meaning that the word is
ambiguous. Finding such an ambiguous word in the statute dealing
with workmen's compensation provides a proper situation in which
to apply the rule of construction set out in Pannellv. State Compensation Comm'r, 126 W. Va. 725, 30 S.E.2d 129 (1944), where it was
held that applications for compensation should be viewed most
liberally in favor of workers and their dependents.
It is with the above liberality which the court seems to have
decided the principal case when they held that the phrase "continuous period", as used in Sections 1, 15 and 15b, means with
reasonable continuity.
C. F. S., Jr.
BOOK REVIEW
CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAwYERS. By Orie L. Phillips and Phil-

brick McCoy. Los Angeles: Parker and Company. 1952. Pp. xiii, 247.
This book is a report compiled by judges and lawyers, about
the conduct of judges and lawyers, for the benefit of judges and
lawyers and the public generally. It is a sort of microscopic
mirror by which judges and lawyers may see themselves as others
see them. It is a study of professional ethics, discipline and disbarment.
A word about the background will be helpful. Some years ago
a "Survey of the Legal Profession" was undertaken under the
auspices of the American Bar Association. In substance, the
function of the survey was to marshal the assets and examine the
liabilities of the legal profession. An examination of the survey
organization, as set out in 37 American Bar Association Journal
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